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Certification Programs
JAYE ELLIS*
ABSTRACT
Certification programs created by nonstate actors such as the Forest
Stewardship Council and Marine Stewardship Council are innovative
and potentially highly effective governance initiatives. This article works
from the premise that these Councils can be understood as political
authorities promulgating law. These Councils, and other actors like
them, are generally analyzed from the point of view of governance, which
triggers questions about their effectiveness and legitimacy. The approach
adopted here shifts the focus to questions of their authority and the
validity of the rules, standards, and decision-making processes that they
have put in place. The Councils have put in motion elaborate networks of
actors, creating interactions among social systems and making possible
translations from the medium of one system to another. In this manner,
the resources of these social systems are made available to the Councils:
truth (science), money (economics), power (politics), legality (law), and so
forth. One of the challenges that the Councils now face is to pursue the
constitutionalization of these networks in the interest of protecting the
autonomy of the range of social systems implicated in them while, at the
same time, ensuring that these systems' resources are available within
the network. Particular attention will be devoted to the role of law within
the networks constituted by the Councils. The role of law is currently
difficult to discern; law tends to be closely bound up with science and
politics. The concept of the societal constitution serves to draw attention
to the threats to law's autonomy within these networks and sheds light
on the particular, and unique, contributions that law could make.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and School of Environment, McGill University.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2012 should have been a banner year for international
environmental law and politics. June 2012 was the fortieth anniversary
of the watershed United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972.1 The occasion was
marked by the Rio +20 Summit, which attracted disappointingly few
heads of state and little media attention.2 The year 2012 was also the
year in which parties to the Kyoto Protocol were supposed to have met
their first set of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and the Protocol
was to have been supplemented by a new instrument establishing a
further and more ambitious set of goals for a second commitment
period.3 These and other disappointments lead civil society actors to
turn their attention to alternative approaches to environmental
governance that do not depend on state-based political authority or the
validity of state-based law, though they may still tap into these
resources. A growing number of initiatives seek to create economic
incentives for industrial actors to meet higher standards for
environmental protection than states appear capable of providing
through domestic or international law.
This paper will concentrate on two organizations, the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC)4 and the Marine Stewardship Council
1. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972 (A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1).
2. Rio+20: Le Brisil gagnant, la planite perdante, LE MONDE (June 22, 2012),
available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/06/22/rio-20-le-bresil-gagnant-la-
planete-perdante_1723211_3232.html; Jonathan Watts & Adam Vaughan, Rio+20
Summit Talks turn into Rubber-Stamp Job, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2012), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/junI/20/rio2O-earth-summit-talks. But see
Simon Romero & John M. Broder, Progress on the Sidelines as Rio Conference Ends,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/americas/rio2O-conference-ends-with-some-
progress-on-the-sidelines.html?_r=0.
3. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Decision 1/CMP.1: Consideration of commitments for subsequent periods for
Parties included in Annex I to the Convention under Article 3, paragraph 9, of the Kyoto
Protocol (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1).
4. The FSC was founded in 1992 by a group of industry and civil society actors in the
wake of the failure of states participating in the Rio Conference on Environment and
Development to conclude a convention on forestry. History, An Innovative Idea Takes Root,
FSC, https://ic.fsc.org/our-history.17.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). The FSC pursues
environmental, economic, and social goals, as set out in its Mission Statement. Our Vision
and Mission, FSC, https://ic.fsc.org/vision-mission.12.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) ("The
Forest Stewardship Council A.C. (FSC) shall promote environmentally appropriate,
socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world's forests.").
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(MSC),5 which have put in place programs for the certification of
forestry and fisheries products, respectively. These certification
programs are enforced through networks of scientists, governments,
media, industry actors, and members of civil society by means of
market-based incentives. The success of these certification programs
depends on the capacity of the Councils to translate ethical-political
convictions about environmental protection, sustainable development,
and social justice (in the case of the FSC) into economic incentives for
industry actors to improve their environmental and social performance.6
This process of translation depends on a sequence of translations among
the media of truth (science), money (economics), power (politics), legality
(law), good or right (ethics) and others.
I argue that the Councils can usefully and meaningfully be
described as public international authorities wielding formal, though
nonstate-based, authority through standards, principles, rules, and
criteria that can be understood as formal law.7 Looking at the Councils
and their certification programs in this manner helps us to see certain
potential shortcomings and weaknesses that are otherwise difficult to
identify or analyze, but which come to the fore when we begin to ask
questions about the functioning of these certification programs as part
of a legal system. As we will see, the respective roles of many of the
social systems implicated in the Councils' networks-notably law,
science, politics, and economics-are fairly easy to discern. However, the
manner in which these systems are brought together raises some
concerns for the autonomy of the respective systems and the possibility
of colonization of the certification programs by the logic of one or
another among them.8 The discussion here will focus on potential
threats to the autonomy of law. The FSC and the MSC have clearly
sought to make both their substantive and procedural rules closely
5. The MSC was founded by the World Wildlife Federation and Unilever in 1996; it
became an independent entity in 1998. Its mission is narrower than that of the FSC,
focusing on sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. Vision and Mission, MARINE
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-us/vision-mission (last visited Oct. 1,
2013) ("Our mission is to use our ecolabel and fishery certification programme to
contribute to the health of the world's oceans by recognising and rewarding sustainable
fishing practices, influencing the choices people make when buying seafood, and working
with our partners to transform the seafood market to a sustainable basis."). The FSC and
MSC will be referred to collectively as the Councils. Reference will also be made more
generally to certification programs or certification organizations.
6. Lars H. Gulbrandsen, The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship
Council, 33 MARINE POLICY 654, 655 (2009).
7. See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Public-Private Regulation:
The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 47, 49, 61 ff. (2006).
8. Poul F. Kjaer, Embeddedness through Networks: A Critical Appraisal of the
Network Concept in the Oeuvre of Karl-Heinz Ladeur, 10 GERMAN L.J. 483, 495 (2009).
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resemble law, and they have succeeded, at least in a superficial way.
However, they are in the process of repeating many of the mistakes that
have been made by states at the domestic and international level as
they seek to bring law to bear on environmental degradation. On the
other hand, certain aspects of the Councils' approach (notably, the
manner in which different types of expertise interact within the regimes
and the potential for dynamic development of the Councils' standards)
are potentially very promising, given the conditions of complexity and
uncertainty under which environmental decision-making must take
place.
The objects of the societal constitution are the regimes that have
emerged around the FSC and MSC.9 The concept of a constitution that
is not state-based has begun to gain acceptance in the literature. 0 The
contention that a constitution may not apply to a particular polity and
derive its legitimacy from that polity remains deeply troubling to many
commentators." The FSC and MSC present themselves as acting in the
public interest, 12 and not just in the name of their members.' 3 However,
they remain private actors, which have bestowed authority upon
themselves. The public in whose name they purport to act is not a body
politic with reasonably stable boundaries; it is a dynamic group of
9. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus
in der Globalisierung 97 ff. (Suhrkamp. 2012) for a discussion of the constitution of a nonstate
regime.
10. Ulrich K. Preuss, Disconnecting Constitutions From Statehood: Is Global
Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 23 (Petra
Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010); Neil Walker, Beyond the Holistic Constitution?, in
THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 291, supra; Martin Loughlin, What is
Constitutionalism?, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 47, supra. But see Mattias
Kumm, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Between Constitutional Triumphalism
and Nostalgia, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 201, 204, 212, supra, for a
discussion of literature skeptical of this position and for his own critique of constitutions
beyond the state.
11. For a discussion of the difficulties posed by a constitution not established on close
interaction between a pouvoir constituant and a pouvoir constitud, see TEUBNER, supra
note 9, at 100 ff. A number of authors committed to the concept of a constitution beyond
the state nevertheless point to the need for some form of legitimation by a polity, see
Walker, supra note 10, 206; Petra Dobner, More Law, Less Democracy? Democracy and
Transnational Constitutionalism, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 141, supra
note 10.
12. See the mission statement of the FSC, supra note 4, and the MSC's mission
statement, supra note 5.
13. This is particularly true of the MSC, which is not a membership organization. See
Karsten Nowrot, Marine Stewardship Council, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REGIMEs (Christian Tietje & Alan Brouder eds., 2009).
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stakeholders. 14 As Teubner argues, the constitution ought to be
understood not as constituting a body politic, but rather
communications. 15 Among the most important communications
circulating throughout the regime are those among the social systems
brought together in networks by the Councils. These networks, and the
communications which flow through them, are essential, as the
resources that the Councils are able to tap into are not their own: they
are placed at the disposal of the certification programs by the various
social systems that interact within the networks. The societal
constitution draws our attention to ways in which the rough equilibrium
among social systems could be upset and the certification programs
colonized by one or another of the systems. The most obvious danger to
the integrity of the Councils' projects is their colonization by economics,
given their heavy reliance on market mechanisms.1 6 But the dangers of
corruption by science, politics, and law are equally present. Closely
related to this second point, the societal constitution directs attention to
the particular role that law could play within this network, but also to
the difficulties that law presently encounters in asserting and
protecting its autonomy.
There is a further issue that will require attention-namely, what
an autonomous body of law, operating within the Councils' networks,
could look like. The concept of the societal constitution does not shed
much light on the structure and content of a legal system beyond
drawing attention to the contingency of those questions. Law takes a
certain form in a given society due to a range of historical, cultural, and
14. The governance structure and decision-making processes of the two Councils
provide for extensive involvement of a range of civil society actors. One example of the
MSC's attempts to ensure openness and representativeness is its Stakeholder Council. See
Stakeholder Council Terms of Reference, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/msc-stakeholder-councillstakeholder-
council-terms-of-
reference/?searchterm=stakeholder%20council%20terms%20of/o20reference (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013). With respect to the FSC, a good example is the tripartite governance
structure of its General Assembly, with three chambers representing economic, social, and
environmental interests. See Membership Chambers, FSC, https://ic.fsc.org/membership-
chambers.77.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). For different analyses of the move from citizen
to stakeholder see Moritz Renner, The Dialectics of Transnational Economic
Constitutionalism, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 422 (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011); Regine
Kreide, Re-embedding the Market through Law? The Ambivalence of Juridification in the
International Context, in KARL POLANYI: GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 44 ff., supra.
15. TEUBNER, supra note 9, at 103.
16. James Lawson & Benjamin Cashore, The Application of the Theory of Social
Autopoiesis to the Problem of Non-State Sanctioned, Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance,
Forest Policy Centre, Internal Working Paper Series No. 120, 12.
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other factors, but it could very well have developed differently. In order
to describe what I see as being law's potential role, and to identify the
many ways in which the Councils' constitutions fall short in this
respect, I turn to two bodies of literature: work on the rule of law in the
welfare state and research on environmental decision-making and
post-normal science.
I. CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS AS ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
NETWORKS
The Councils rely heavily on democratic principles because they do
not possess formal political authority, and they clearly require access to
a resource that can enable them to offer resistance to the force of
economic logic. Their standards have a certain credibility because they
are not the creatures of industry associations.17 Furthermore, they have
the backing of various segments of society through representative
governance structures and decision-making processes that are
accessible to more punctual input from members of civil society.18 The
authority of science also supports them, the effect of which is present in
various places in governance and decision-making. The credibility from
this authority and the legitimacy derived from close attention to and
respect for democratic principles allow Councils to produce effective
certification programs.1 9 But if they rely solely on politics to generate
17. The MSC was initially launched by Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund for
Nature, but was later constituted as an independent organization. Concerns were
expressed about the participation of Unilever, a major manufacturer of fish products. See,
e.g., Douglas H. Constance & Alessandro Bonnano, Regulating the Global Fisheries: The
World Wildlife Fund, Unilever, and the Marine Stewardship Council, 17 AGRICULTURE &
HUMAN VALUES 125, 131 (2000). See also Gulbrandsen, supra note 6, at 655.
18. Benjamin Cashore notes the reliance of the Councils and similar organizations on
"'external audiences,' who are encouraged to accept the NSMD [nonstate market-driven]
governance system based on economic material benefits. . ., moral suasion . . ., or because
it has become an accepted and understandable practice." Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy
and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven
(NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503, 511
(2002).
19. See Nowrot, supra note 13, at 724 ff. (2009). Nowrot distinguishes between
"input-oriented" and "output-oriented" perspectives, the latter focusing more closely on
participation in governance and decision-making and the latter on the organization's
effectiveness. Nowrot argues that the MSC and FSC differ in this respect, with the MSC
taking a more top-down, technocratic approach, while the FSC relies more heavily on
legitimacy derived from participation by a range of stakeholders. Nowrot argues that this
poses a problem for the MSC, which it appears to have recognized-he notes the heavy
investment by the organization to enhance its transparency and accessibility. Id. at 725.
See also Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance be
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adherence to (or at least acceptance of) structures and processes for
governance and decision-making, the system would be too unstable:
legitimacy is far too open-ended a concept and subject to radically
different interpretations by the disparate group of actors that somehow
must work together to make the system function. Similarly, science is
dynamic, and scientists will disagree on answers to questions about
whether a given resource is well managed or sustainably harvested or
whether the risks associated with resource exploitation are acceptable. 20
As in any society (or, in this case, societal fragment), the need for law
becomes apparent: without it, the interactions of social systems
networks, which the certification programs depend upon to be effective,
would be significantly weaker and less stable. I will return to this point
below.
The certification programs under discussion here are embedded in
networks that facilitate the coupling of political-ethical goals (i.e.
sustainable exploitation of resources and equitable exploitation and
distribution of resources) and market signals (certification as a means of
maintaining or increasing market share).21 The societal constitution
permits an account of the Councils as political authorities and gives
their certification programs (and the principles and standards on which
they are based) formal legal validity. To date, the first of the two roles
that Gunther Teubner attributes to the societal constitution has been
accomplished: the Councils have constituted themselves and have given
themselves the authority to promulgate rules. Through their
interactions with civil society organizations, scientists, and industry
actors, they have also constituted the network upon which the
effectiveness of their certification programs relies. The second
role-namely, the self-limitation of the social systems whose resources
are drawn on-has not been fulfilled, though some tentative steps have
been taken in this direction.22
Certification programs, possessing no legal or constitutional
authority to impose norms or standards on industry actors, must
instead rely on perceptions of their legitimacy and credibility.
Certification organizations possess or command relatively few resources
but must nevertheless be able to make credible threats and promises to
industry regarding the impact that certification will have on their
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 347 (2007);
Cashore, supra note 18.
20. These are, of course, political questions, answers to which rely heavily on scientific
expertise but which must ultimately be the object of political judgment.
21. For a discussion of the role of networks in creating interconnections among social
systems, see Kjaer, supra note 8.
22. TEUBNER, supra note 9, at 72-73.
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profitability. To do this, certification organizations must tap into the
resources of a range of social systems and set in motion a series of
translations from the medium of one system to another. The most
important of these resources is the authority of natural and social
sciences. This authority can be used to demonstrate that certification
standards are grounded in solid expertise. It also demonstrates the
authority of domestic and international law and policy; ethical or
political objectives held by civil society organizations, opinion leaders,
and citizens more generally; and the purchasing power of wholesalers,
retailers, and consumers. Certification makes it possible for citizens to
translate their ethical-political convictions, based on scientific
information received directly or, more commonly, distilled by the media
and opinion leaders, into purchasing decisions. Citizens can organize
and bring pressure to bear on industry, but this pressure is often too
diffuse to be effective. Citizens' ethical-political message is much more
likely to be translated into the medium of money when they present
themselves as consumers.
To create incentives for industry to certify their operations, opinion
leaders and, ultimately, individual citizens must be convinced that it is
worthwhile to opt for certified over noncertified products. This requires
a perception that adherence to the requisite principles and standards
makes a difference in the way in which resources are exploited. 23 The
standards on which certification is granted or withheld must be
grounded in various forms of scientific and technical expertise. Civil
society actors must also be convinced that the governance structures
and decision-making processes of certification organizations are
representative, inclusive, and accountable, such that they respect
democratic principles, while at the same time being highly accessible to
those possessing expertise. The Councils can bolster their legitimacy by
constituting themselves and behaving as much like governments as
possible and by compensating for their lack of governmental authority,
notably by bolstering their democratic credentials. The governance
structures and decision-making processes of the FSC and MSC were
clearly constructed with these kinds of objectives in mind. A range of
experts and stakeholders are represented within their governance
23. Cashore describes this as "pragmatic legitimacy." Cashore, supra note 18, at 518.
This is to be distinguished from other types of legitimacy, namely moral and cognitive, on
which the FSC and similar organizations rely. His framework for analyzing different types
of legitimacy is drawn from Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and
Institutional Approaches, 20 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REV. 571 (1995).
These certification programs face significant challenges, and their effectiveness has
been called into question. See Gulbrandsen, supra note 6, at 657 ff.; Graeme Auld, Lars H.
Gulbrandsen & Constance L.McDermott, Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests
and Forestry, 33 ANN. REV. OF ENVIRON. & RESOURCES 187 (2008).
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL CERTIFICATION 1043
structures,24 called on to comment on draft "legislation,"25 and given
means to critique decisions on certification. 26
The Councils' authority and the validity of their rules and standards
are self-constituted. As Teubner argues with respect to international
arbitration contracts, attention must be drawn away from the paradox
of self-constitution in order for authority and validity to be well
established. 27 He identifies three techniques to accomplish this:
hierarchy, externalization, and the simple passage of time.28 Through
their highly-formalized governance and decision-making structures, the
FSC and MSC have clearly managed to establish a hierarchy among
primary rules-the principles and standards to which organizations
seeking or possessing certification are subject-and secondary rules that
24. The MSC's governance structure includes a Technical Advisory Board which
advises the Board of Trustees, and which is consulted at various stages in the process of
adopting standard. MSC Standard Setting Procedure 2.0. As for the FSC, a Working
Group is established to develop standards and its members are selected on the basis of
expert knowledge and representativeness. The Development and Approval of FSC Social
and Environmental International Standards, FSC, FSC-PRO-01-001 (Version 2-0) (2006).
The MSC's main governing body, the Board of Trustees, is advised by a Technical
Advisory Board and a Stakeholder Council. The latter is comprised of a Commercial
Chamber and a Public Interest Chamber. Structure, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Trustees are
nominated by Board members and approved by consensus of the Board.
In the case of the FSC, the main governing body is the General Assembly, which is
comprised of three Chambers: Social, Environmental and Economic. Each chamber is
comprised of Southern and Northern subchambers. The Board of Directors is comprised of
members who are elected from each chamber. Governance, FSC,
https://ic.fsc.org/governance. 14.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
25. Within the FSC, a Consultative Forum made up of potentially affected
stakeholders is established when a new standards is proposed, and rounds of public
consultations are held. Standard Setting, FSC, https://ic.fsc.org/standard-setting.212.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
Within the MSC, proposed standards are subject to public consultation and must
be approved by the Technical Advisory Board (TAB), Steering Committee and Board of
Trustees. MSC Standard Setting Procedure 2.0. The Review and Revision of Existing MSC
International Standards and the Development of any New MSC International Standards,
MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/documents/consultations (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013). See also Gulbrandsen, supra note 6, at 33.
26. Both Councils have a complaints procedure that can be invoked by a wide range of
actors. See FSC Procedure, Processing Formal Complaints in the FSC Certification
Scheme, FSC, FSC-PRO-09-002 (V2-0) (2011), http://www.fsc.org/proce dures.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2013); MSC Complaints Procedure (2011), MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www. msc.org/documents/consultations/MSC-Complaints-Procedure.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
27. Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina:' Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 16 (1997); Lawson & Cashore, supra note 16, at 13.
28. Teubner, supra note 27.
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govern the creation,29 modification, and application of those primary
rules, including dispute resolution.30
Care is also taken to enhance the rigor of substantive and
procedural rules through externalization. We see evidence of this in the
process of accreditation itself, which is handled by third-party
accreditors who are themselves certified by another independent
organization, Accreditation Services International (ASI).31 In addition,
the programs are measured against a series of external benchmarks and
standards. 32 Furthermore, both Councils belong to the ISEAL Alliance,
an umbrella organization for certification programs. ISEAL has also
29. In the FSC, the crafting of international standards is highly structured and subject
to widespread publicity and public comment. Primary responsibility for drafting a new
standard lies with a Working Group, overseen by a Steering Committee which ensures
compliance with applicable procedures. Final approval authority lies with the Board of
Directors. See Standard Setting, supra note 25.
As for the development of regional and national standards, FSC International is
involved in two main ways: first, it provides fairly detailed rules to regional and national
organisations on the development of standards. FSC International Standard-Structure
and Content of National Forest Stewardship Standards, FSC, FSC-STD-60-002 (V 1-0)
(2009), http://www.fsc.org/national_ standards.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). It also
provides fairly detailed guidance. FSC Guideline: FSC Forest Stewardship Standards:
Structure, Content and Suggested Indicators, FSC, FSC-GUI-60-001 (V 1-0) (2010),
http://www.fsc.org/194.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Second, regional and national
policies and standards are subject to approval by FSC International. Structure and
Content of National Forest Stewardship Standards, supra.
The MSC's procedure for the development of principles and standards is less
developed but nevertheless provides for extensive publicity and comment.
Standard-Setting Procedure 2.0, supra note 25.
30. Within the FSC, provision is made for appeals from accreditation decisions and
from decisions of the FSC itself. FSC Procedure-Processing Appeals, FSC, FSC-PRO-01-
005 (v 2-1) (2011), http://www.fsc.org/documents.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). There are
also procedures for the submission to the FSC and ASI of informal complaints. FSC
Procedures-Processing Complaints, FSC, FSC-PRO-01-008 (V 1-0) (2009),
http://www.fsc.org/documents.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Formal complaints also have
designated procedures. FSC Procedure-Processing Formal Complaints in the FSC
Certification Scheme, FSC, FSC-PRO-01-009 (V 2-0) (2011),
http://www.fsc.org/documents.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
The MSC has a procedure for objecting to a decision on certification which is
structured along the lines of judicial review. MSC Certification Requirements, v. 1.2, Jan.
10, 2012, Annex CD, at C139 ff., http://www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-
standards/MSC environmentalstandard forsustainable-fishing.pdf/ view (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013).
31. Third Party Certification, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/
about-us/standards/third-party-certification (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
32. In the case of the MSC, these include criteria issued by the UN Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) intended to guide the certification process. Guidelines for
the Ecolabelling of Fish and Fishery Products from Marine Capture Fisheries, Revision 1,
UN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (2009), http://www.fao.org
/docrep/012/i1119t/i1119t00.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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issued guidelines on certification. 33 ISEAL itself seeks to bolster its
credibility by measuring its guidelines against those of other
organizations, notably the International Standards Organisation (ISO)34
and those incorporated into the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade at Annex 3.35 These appeals to external standards present
practical advantages: the Councils, as well as ISEAL, are able to tap
into the credibility and authority of well-respected nongovernmental
and intergovernmental groups. In addition to constituting an
interesting technique for deflecting attention away from the
self-constituted nature of the Councils' authority, the codes of conduct
promulgated by ISEAL, the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations), and other organizations can be seen as an attempt
to outline proto-constitutional principles for certification programs.
As for the third technique, reliance on the passage of time, these
regimes are too new and their authorship of the certification standards
still too much in evidence for certification to have taken on the kind of
taken-for-granted quality possessed by many state-based (and some
nonstate-based) rules. Still, the boundary between state-based and
nonstate-based law in this area is being blurred in modest but
potentially interesting ways. For example, a number of governmental
authorities have sought and obtained accreditation from the MSC and
FSC.36 In time, this interaction between state agencies and nonstate
33. Three sets of guidelines have been promulgated by ISEAL: the Code of Good
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards; the Code of Good Practice for
Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards; and the Code of Good
Practice for Assuring Compliance with Social and Environmental Standards. Our Codes of
Good Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-
credibility/codes-of-good-practice (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). Work is currently underway on
a set of Credibility Principles, which include clear objectives, transparency, openness to a
range of stakeholders, measurable and objective criteria and impartial and independent
verification of compliance with standards.
34. Comparison of Standard-Setting Code and WTO TBT, ISEAL ALLIANCE, R025,
Version 3.0 (March 2010). The ISO standards to which comparison was drawn are the
ISO/IEC Guide 59: Code of Good Practice for Standardisation (1994).
35. Comparison of Standard-Setting Code and WTO TBT, supra note 34; Centre for
International Environmental Law and ISEAL Alliance, International Standards and
Technical Barriers to Trade, R053-Legal Opinion Summary (July 2006).
36. As of December 2012, 22.6% of certificates were issued for forests whose tenure
was managed publicly. Global FSC Certificates: Type and Distribution, FSC, Jan. 2013,
available at https://ic.fsc.org/download.facts-and-figures-january-2013.a-1622.pdf.
Baden-Wiirttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate are seeking FSC certification for federal
forests. FSC, ic.fsc.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). A number of governments have
incorporated FSC standards into their legislation on forest conservation and management,
for example by requiring FSC certification prior to permitting exploitation of forest
products. Governmental Use of Voluntary Standards: Care Study 4, ISEAL ALLIANCE,
Sept. 2008, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/
files/R079_GUVS_InnovationinSustainabilityGovernanceO.pdf. State-based agencies
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political authorities may come to obscure the latter's lack of a formal,
state-based pedigree.
II. FROM LEGALIZATION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM
The central aim of certification programs is to influence the
behavior of industry actors through economic incentives. The most
apparent danger faced by such programs is the unlimited expansion of
economic logic, such that it comes to drive the programs at the expense
of the logics of other systems.3 7 This could mean, for example, that
powerful industry actors, whose cooperation is deemed necessary to the
success of the programs, could threaten to withdraw their cooperation if
decisions do not go their way. It could also mean that the medium of
money comes to be the only one that counts within the program, that all
decisions are made with an eye to efficiency, and that other
considerations are subordinated to this one-or worse, that other
considerations cannot readily be spoken about because the language
necessary to express them is not available within the structure of the
program.
The certification programs put in place by the Councils seek to
address these dangers by placing other logics front and center in
decision-making processes. In other words, the certification programs do
not represent an attempt by the economic system to impose limits on
itself; the constitutional subject is the transnational, nongovernmental
regime, and not the social system or subsystem. 38 The Councils have set
in motion this complex interaction among social systems, but they do
not control it. On the contrary, the success of certification appears to
depend on perceptions that the deployment of political-ethical
convictions, scientific knowledge, and legal validity are not controlled by
the Councils, but rather that those organizations are highly responsive
to inputs from these systems.
The difficulty, made clear by the concept of the societal constitution,
is that structural coupling between these various systems is highly
imperfect and that the Councils are at risk of simply being buffeted
about by confrontations among social systems that do not have
that have received MSC certification include the South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee,
the Metlakatla Indian Community in Alaska, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu), and the Government of South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands. MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, www.msc.org (last visited Oct.
1, 2013). See Meidinger, supra note 7, at 59 ff. for a discussion of governmental
involvement in the FSC and other nonstate forest certification processes.
37. TEUBNER, supra note 9, at 89.
38. Id. at 94 ff.
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reasonably effective means of communicating with one another. An
excellent example of these confrontations among systems is provided by
the poorly defined role of law within the networks constituted by the
Councils' certification programs.
A. Autonomy of the Law
In order for law-or any social system-to carry out the roles and
functions that are generally expected of it, it must maintain its
autonomy from the other social systems with which it interacts. In fields
such as the environment and human rights, this can be a difficult
challenge because these bodies of law tend to depend heavily on other
social systems-notably politics, ethics, and, in the case of the
environment in particular, science. Translating the political objectives
of environmental protection and the promotion of human rights into
rules of law is a difficult task, and efforts in this direction often lead to
the creation of mostly hortatory legal rules, simply because the
articulation of legal rights or obligations and of standards by which to
measure compliance is difficult to accomplish. Because law can
accomplish things that other social systems cannot, the articulation of
legal rules that do not depend heavily on operations within other social
systems is essential. For example, it may make sense from a political,
moral, or strategic point of view for a state to intervene in a civil war
taking place in a neighboring state in support of a rebel group, but
because there is no realistic way to make a generalizable category
distinction between just and unjust rebellions, there is a legal rule
against such intervention.39 In assigning responsibility to a firm for
contributing to environmental harm, a court does not need to wait for a
scientific report establishing the precise proportion of the firm's
contribution to the harm; it can turn to a rule crafted by judges or
legislators that apportions liability in a manner that is both politically
and legally defensible even if "unscientific."40 Nor are judicial
conclusions subject to continual revision and updating as new
knowledge or understanding emerges. Legal conclusions, unlike ethical
judgments, do not address the goodness of people or the rightness of
39. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
40. Restatement of the Law (3d): Torts, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, §8-Factors for
Assigning Shares of Responsibility; §A18-Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors for Indivisible
Harm. The Qu6bec Civil Code apportions liability among multiple defendants not
according to their respective contributions to the injury, but "in proportion to the
seriousness of the fault of each." Civil Code of Qu6bec, art. 1478.
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action and, thus, can possess validity across different communities
organized around faith or a particular set of values.
The kind of arbitrariness that exists in law, environmental law in
particular, would not likely be acceptable in other spheres such as
politics or science. Importantly, this is not due to any failings or
weaknesses of law as it cannot be otherwise if law is to maintain its
distinctiveness as law, and not collapse into politics or science. However,
if law is to be used to pursue objectives such as sustainability or equity,
this distinctiveness must be explicitly protected. A difficulty currently
faced by the FSC and MSC, which will only grow more acute as the
power and influence of these organizations grow, is that the boundary
between law and other social systems is, despite the high degree of
formality of the organizations' governance structures, highly porous.
An analysis of the structure of the Councils' rules suggests the
presence of a good deal of uncertainty regarding how scientific and
technical expertise can influence both political decisions concerning the
setting of standards and. criteria and legal decisions concerning the
application of these standards. Both Councils have developed several
layers of rules, ranging from broad principles that more closely resemble
political objectives to highly detailed and specific criteria, indicators,
and scoring guidelines that, superficially at least, are structured as
procedural rather than substantive rules. 41 Even then, these guidelines
are very often applied substantively through the performance of
scientific operations. 42 For example, both Councils have developed
criteria that environmental assessment and management plans for
resource extraction must meet. 43 The procedural form of these criteria
suggests that legal operations could be performed on them, but if
interpretation and application of the criteria were left to the operations
of the legal system, questions as to whether a resource is well managed
or sustainably exploited could not be answered in any other than a
41. The FSC has articulated 10 principles, accompanied by broad criteria. Further
standards are developed at a regional and national level; the development of these
standards is subject to guidelines articulated by FSC International, which must also
approve the standards.
The MSC has developed 3 principles and broad criteria, as well as a highly detailed
set of indicators and scoring guidelines; in addition, accreditors develop a further, more
carefully tailored, set of indicators for each certification process.
42. The assessment reports are prepared by teams with strong scientific knowledge
and often some policy and economic expertise; their methodology, structure, and substance
is drawn largely from the sciences. See, e.g., Food Certification International Ltd., MSC
Sustainable Fisheries Certification, AGARBA Spain Barents Sea Cod Fishery: Public
Comment Draft Report, July 2013.
43. FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, FSC, FSC/STD/01/001 (V05-0),
Principle 7: Management Planning; MSC Fishery Standard: Principles and Criteria for
Sustainable Fishing, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, Principle 3 (May 1, 2010).
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purely formal-and highly unsatisfactory-manner. In short, subjecting
these criteria to legal expertise would miss the point. The potential
danger posed by the structure of the Councils' rules is that the legal
form is taken up in a superficial way in an attempt to lend the stability
and predictability associated with legal rules and 'regimes to the
scientific and social-scientific endeavour of developing resource
management plans.
An interesting illustration of this phenomenon is the manner in
which the requirement that certified bodies respect applicable domestic
and international law is evaluated. This is the type of issue on which
legal operations could be carried out, but the approach of both
organizations is to identify a series of proxies that permit accreditors to
verify compliance with domestic laws, including the level of familiarity
of the certified body's staff members -with applicable laws, the
possession by the certified body of up-to-date copies of relevant statutes
and regulations, and the satisfaction of legal requirements such as
registration with national authorities and payment of license fees.44
These and the other "verifiers" may be reasonably good ways of
measuring compliance, but they fall well short of calling for the
interpretation and application of domestic and international rules by
accreditors. This is likely due to reluctance to appear to be treading on
the jurisdiction of national and regional authorities, but it provides an
excellent illustration of the distance that is placed between what is
being measured and what the measurement stands for. The use of
proxies and indicators is unavoidable-accreditation bodies cannot
provide direct answers to questions such as, "is this resource exploited
sustainably?" Instead, they must answer the question indirectly by
performing operations that permit resource exploitation to be placed in
either the "certifiable" or the "uncertifiable" category. The issue here is
that the proxies being used-apparently for the purpose of making the
process of measurement repeatable, verifiable, and transparent-may in
fact make it difficult for any of the social systems to make the kinds of
contributions that are expected of them.
In practice, the standards tend to be viewed as substantive, not
procedural. That is, accreditation bodies do not take a purely formal
approach to evaluating the quality of a management plan; they instead
carry out scientific operations, at least to a limited extent, to determine
whether various standards and criteria are satisfied.45 This makes a
good deal of sense, given the types of questions that must be answered
44. See, e.g., FSC Guideline: FSC Forest Stewardship Standards, supra note 29.
45. Lawson and Cashore argue that the standards applied by certifiers must operate as
legal standards, but that the certification decisions must be scientifically based. Lawson &
Cashore, supra note 16, at 20
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in order for a determination on certification to be made. While one can
imagine various ways in which the legal system could or should be
implicated in the making of these decisions, it makes little sense to
attempt to transform a decision-making procedure that requires inputs
from a wide range of expert and lay bodies of knowledge into a series of
legal operations. The structure of the Councils' rules suggests a good
deal of uncertainty as to how to classify the operation (science, policy,
law?) and as to how to structure the relationships among these and
other social systems.
Another example of the tensions and overlap among social systems
is provided by the process put in place by the MSC for objections to
certification decisions.46 This procedure very closely resembles judicial
review. Its stated objective is not "to review the subject fishery against
the MSC Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries, but to
determine whether the certification body made an error that materially
affected the outcome of its Determination."47 The procedure is fairly
formal, ultimately involving a hearing before an adjudicator, following
which a decision can be taken to remand the certification decision to the
certification body. 48 At present, the adjudicators are all lawyers.49 On
one level, this makes perfect sense, as the object of the resolution of
disputes regarding certification decisions cannot be to resolve political
or scientific controversy, but rather to determine whether the rules and
procedures were respected. However, given the heavy dependence of
accreditation reports on scientific expertise, concerns are raised that the
adjudicators would have to possess expertise in fisheries biology,
fisheries management, and/or marine ecology,50 or they would need to
rely heavily on their technical advisors.5 1 The question is
whether-given the nature of MSC principles, standards, criteria, and
indicators-judicial review of certification decisions can serve the kinds
46. MSC Certification Requirements, supra note 30 (Objections Procedure, Annex CD).
47. Id. at para. CD 2.1.1.1.
48. Id. at para. CD 2.7.2. The criteria include serious errors that made a material
difference to the outcome; unjustifiable scores resulting from a mistake, failure to consider
relevant information, or arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion.
49. Independent Adjudicators-Biographies, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
www.msc.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
50. Jennifer Jacquet & Daniel Pauly, Seafood Stewardship in Crisis, 467 NATURE 28,
28 (2010). Jacquet and Pauly bemoan the lack of fisheries expertise and the "bureaucratic"
rather than "biological" nature of the objections procedure. The process of judicial review
is not (or at least should not be) bureaucratic, and it is possible that the authors are
making a category mistake. Nevertheless, given the nature of the standards whose
applications the adjudicators are to evaluate, serious questions may be raised about the
relevance of legal expertise to the process.
51. Adjudicators may call on "technical advisors." MSC Certification Requirements,
supra note 46, at s. 4.7.
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of purposes that it is meant to serve in other areas of administrative
law-namely, to maintain certain standards of procedural fairness and
to prevent abuse of authority by administrative decisionmakers.
In order to understand what roles law could play and what
contributions it could make to the Councils' certification programs, we
must have some perspective on the proprium, or the form, of law.
B. The Form of Law
Autopoietic theory itself avoids providing a definition of law, either
from the inside (i.e. a definition that would make sense to jurists and
others who work within the legal system by participating in its
operations) or from the outside (i.e. a definition that would make sense
to those who interact with the legal system by concluding contracts,
suing or being sued, or seeking to bring their behavior in conformity
with legal rules) beyond the identification of the binary code
(legal/illegal; law/not law),52 which the legal system uses to
communicate with its environment. This is because the contents of the
legal system-its program-are contingent, resulting from the manner
in which law receives, interprets, and performs operations on inputs
and responds to irritations.53 Over time, certain self-understandings
about law's roles and functions, along with descriptions of the legal
system generated within other legal systems and understandings of the
52. This distinction is often misconstrued as proceeding from a functional definition of
law as command and thus as reducing all of law to the kinds of commands and
prohibitions typical of substantive rules of criminal law. Michael King and Chris Thornhill
argue, however, that this has much to do with the fact that Recht/Unrecht cannot be
translated directly into English as a single pair of concepts. They note that the application
of the binary distinction will vary depending on the type of issue to which the legal code is
being applied. For example, in private law, the application of the distinction
lawfullunlawful will be treated as focusing attention on the "lawful" side of the code: being
right in law. In criminal law, the 'lawful" side will be treated as the residual category. At
other times, the two sides of the code will represent, respectively, communications that the
law recognizes are relevant to the legal system (the contract was not notarized) and those
that it does not (the defendant wore a red tie). King and Thornhill state: 'The subtlety and
complexity of the relationship between Recht and Unrecht and the flexibility with which it
may be adapted by the legal system's programmes to suit the particular situation are
unfortunately and inevitably lost in translation, owing to the need to change the English
words according to the context in which they are used." MICHAEL KING & CHRIS
THORNHILL, NIKLAS LUHMANN'S THEORY OF POLITICS AND LAW 56-7 (2006). For a
discussion of the operation of the binary code in nonstate law, see Gunther Teubner, The
Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1451
(1991-1992).
53. Gunther Teubner, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 79 (1993).
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legal system held by members of society, will develop. Such
understandings are encapsulated in the concept of the rule of law.
Classic formulations of the rule of law emphasize "[g]overnmental
action . . . based on clearly formulated, publicly declared rules" as
opposed to rule by decree or prerogative.54 Generality was also
considered crucial to the rule of law as ensuring the depersonalized,
impartial exercise of political authority.55 According to other criteria
associated with the rule of law, legal rules must be clear, knowable by
the public, prospective, and stable.56 With the advent of the welfare
state, a challenge to the rule of law other than that of tyranny emerged,
described by Roberto Unger as a contemporary tendency toward
"deformalized 'materialized' regulatory law."57 One manifestation of this
phenomenon is the promulgation of vague, general standards such as
compatibility with the public interest, the best interests of the child, or,
in the case of environmental law, concepts like ecosystem integrity or
sustainable use.58 William Scheuerman aptly describes the potential
dangers of this tendency:
Can this subordination [of the administration to law]
amount to very much. when an administrator is told
simply to decide what the public interest amounts to or
when a judge is asked to determine what is
unconscionable about a contract? Might not the rule of
law be more honestly described as a "rule of
indeterminate resolutions," and does not the distinction
between legal and illegal administrative action risk
becoming unclear? There can be no broad agreement
about what "good morals," "good faith," or
"unconscionable" action means in complex, morally
heterogeneous societies.59
Another consequence is the specification of increasingly dense
networks of norms and standards to which recipients of various forms of
state assistance and other subjects of social justice law are expected to
54. WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW 69 (1994).
55. Id. at 69-70.
56. WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, FRANKFURT SCHOOL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE LAW 30 (2008).
57. ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 193 ff. (1976). See also SCHEUERMAN,
supra note 56, at 94.
58. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 56, at 94-95.
59. Id. at 94.
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conform. Both manifestations of materialized law are heavily
"dependent . . . on implementation of each program by a continuous
administration (instead of controls through occasional legal
pronouncements, as in formalized legal programs)."60 In the field of
social welfare law, the realm of freedom and autonomy of its
beneficiaries is reduced.61
The law of social justice has much in common with environmental
law;62 both are concerned not simply with creating the conditions for the
realization of certain ends that are defined elsewhere, but also with the
bringing about of certain states of affairs. Both are characterized by
materializing tendencies: . they move from vague, general
pronouncements to highly detailed, technical criteria and indicators.
Arguably, the detailed standards are drafted in response to concerns
about the slipperiness of grand principles such as "develop sustainably"
or "respect biological diversity," whereas the grand principles are
present to give some necessary guidance to those charged with
interpreting and applying the detailed criteria. The problem is that the
criteria and indicators of the type that appear in the legal texts
promulgated by the Councils contain little on which the legal system
can gain purchase. Either their interpretation and application depends
on the input of scientific and technical expertise and requires more than
just legal expertise for their interpretation and application, or they have
been transformed into proxies for good scientific research and sound
resource management that may be too far removed from the actual
enterprises of scientific and resource management to be meaningful.
In order to better understand the respective roles of law and other
social systems-notably politics and science-in the application of the
Councils' rules, let us consider what decision-making might look like if
law played no significant role. If law's contribution were absent, the
Councils would depend exclusively on feedback from political, scientific,
and economic systems. Whenever a controversy arises, the Councils
need to manage it as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, since
defection of disillusioned or disaffected actors could easily be fatal to the
network. Thus, when a group feels that it was not adequately
represented or consulted when a decision is taken or when there is a
60. Rudolph Wietholter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 226 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988).
61. JORGEN HABERMAs, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 416 (1998). From the point of view of the legal system,
the result is to "overstrain" the system. Niklas Luhmann, The Self-Reproduction of Law
and its Limits, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 60, at 111, 124.
62. It is probably not appropriate to regard environmental law as separate from social
justice law; the latter is, rather, a subcategory of the former.
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scientific controversy regarding the soundness of a standard or a
certification report, the legitimacy and authority of the Councils are
called into question. If serious doubt is cast on a decision or action by
the Councils, their ability to proffer credible economic threats and
promises to industry actors is weakened. This leaves the Councils
extremely vulnerable to such controversies, which are inevitable and
ongoing. The Councils, any more than state governments, cannot wait
for scientific controversy to be settled or for perfect consensus to emerge
among stakeholders. Councils depend on a high degree of confidence on
the part of network members in the structures and processes put in
place to reach reasonable conclusions on scientific and political issues,
such that those members will maintain their participation in the
network even when decisions do not go their way. This cannot be
accomplished on the strength of political legitimacy and scientific
authority alone. The Councils require political authority, which confers
the capacity to enact valid law.
C. Some Thoughts on the Restructuring of Environmental Law
The difficulties of creating policy objectives and legal rules in the
environmental field, where dependence on scientific expertise developed
in complex and uncertain conditions is heavy, are immense. As
Karl-Heinz Ladeur notes, environmental law is conditioned by the
"necessity of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty."63 In the
recent past, the concept of causation could be relied on to build bridges
between law, science, policy, and other fields: causation was never,
Ladeur emphasizes, a scientific concept that permitted simple
descriptions of phenomena in the natural world but rather a
construction with normative implications. 64 Nevertheless, it did permit
reasonably smooth communications among social systems, as causation
could serve as a kind of boundary object that, although conceived of
differently in each social system, permitted relatively stable interactions
among them.6 5 Ladeur notes, however, that the sciences are slowly
moving away from causal models toward new paradigms that seek to
better model the complexity of the natural world and that are much less
likely to produce stable, reproducible observations.6 6
Ladeur argues that, since causation is a social construction, a new,
more appropriate heuristic can be created that can permit interaction
63. KH LADEUR, DAs UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFr: VON DER
GEFAHRENABWEHR ZUM RISIKOMANAGEMENT 11 (1995) (translation by author).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 84-85.
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among social systems. As science seeks to come to terms with
complexity and uncertainty, law must become more dynamic and
flexible, more open to progressive development.67 Ladeur proposes risk
as the concept around which decision-making procedures must be
organized.68 Because research into the existence of risk could be never
ending, "stop rules" must be crafted that make it possible to stop asking
questions and make a decision but that also attract a certain level of
trust. These rules, like the stop rules that allowed causal models to
function, cannot be constructed on the basis of scientific or technical
inputs alone, since they must attract the confidence not just of the
scientific community but also of the range of other social systems that
are implicated in their interpretation and application.6 9 These stop rules
are procedural in nature, guiding and shaping methods of risk
assessment and analysis. 70 This has many implications for the shape of
legal rules and institutions. Ladeur argues that rules must be
structured to maximize the capacity for learning,71 for example through
the emergence of hybrid institutions that straddle but, importantly, do
not seek to overcome boundaries among social systems. 72
Two questions arise: first, whether the Councils foster or create
room for developments along the lines sketched above; second, whether
these developments are compatible with our current conceptions of the
nature and role of law. If the answer to the second question is no, then
autopoietic theory might predict a gradual reorientation of the legal
system in which its code may remain the same but its self-definition
might take on a different shape.
It might be possible to rethink the interactions among science,
policy, and law in the context of the Councils' principles and standards
so as to avoid the dangers of deformalization and materialization. We
are in the realm of so-called post-normal science, that is, issue-areas
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and salience. Political and
economic stakes are high, but scientists are not in a position to provide
clear answers to questions about the nature and significance of risks.73
As Ladeur argues, the crafting of resources management and
exploitation policies must proceed on an essentially experimental
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 78; 84-89.
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 151.
71. Id. at 155.
72. Id. at 149.
73. SO FUNTOWICZ & JR RAVETZ, Uncertainty, Complexity and Post-normal Science, 13
ENVIRON. ToxicOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 1881, 1882 (1994).
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basis,74 including multiple opportunities for assessment and
reassessment and adjustment of rules and practices as necessary.
Furthermore, because of the difficulty of communications between social
systems, regimes must be designed to keep these systems in constant
contact with one another, providing many opportunities for mutual
irritation 7 5 Autopoietic theory would describe this process in terms of
the disappointed expectations of, for example, scientists on the one hand
and political authorities on the other, leading to irritations to each
system that may result in revisions to the programs in which these
actors participate. In particular, the model that the political system
constructs for the nature and production of scientific knowledge could
come to be more sophisticated, though of course this sophistication can
never reach the point at which scientific meaning can be received
directly and immediately by the political system.
The Councils have taken many important steps in these directions.
Their structures and processes are designed to keep scientists in
constant contact with industry and civil society actors. The provisional
nature of certification, subject in both regimes to regular assessment
and reconsideration, ought to make it more difficult for actors to acquire
de facto rights to certification and make it necessary for them to
continue to renew their efforts to meet the broad objectives articulated
by the Councils. It is not enough for them to simply proceed with the
implementation of a management plan that has received a stamp of
approval. The standards themselves are subject to regular reevaluation.
But a larger question emerges-namely, whether the flexibility and
dynamism that these regimes work hard to maintain, and that
74. LADEUR, supra note 63, at 94. See also BRUNO LATOUR, POLITIQUES DE LA NATURE:
COMMENT FAIRE ENTRER LES SCIENCES EN DEMOCRATIE 231 ff. (2004); KERRY H.
WHITESIDE, Precautionary Theory: Science, Uncertainty, and Political Authority, in
PRECAUTIONARY POLITICS: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK 109-11 (2006).
75. The concept of the "boundary organization" has received a good deal of attention in this
respect: these organisations experiment with different ways of bringing together different kinds
of knowledge and expertise, with a view to solving or at least addressing particular problems.
One of the more famous examples is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, created
by the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organisation
'provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts:' httpJ/www.ipcc.ch
/organization/organization.shtml#.UBa812HbCYQ. See C. MILLER, Hybrid Management:
Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental Governance in the Climate
Regime, 26 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN VALUES 478 (2001); CLARK A. MILLER, Challenges
in the Application of Science to Global Affairs: Contingency, Trust, and Moral Order, in
CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, 478
(Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001). See also Karl-Heinz Ladeur's discussion of
"hybrid institutions" in LADEUR, supra note 63, at 149.
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post-normal science demands, are compatible with the form of law. The
answer, I believe, is a qualified yes. In important respects, the
considerations that are central to the rule of law, and more specifically
the concerns that have emerged regarding materialized law, converge
with the challenges of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.
Whether one favors certainty and predictability or flexibility and
dynamism, the inappropriateness of detailed legislation that
accompanies actors and the things they produce along a carefully
constructed path from cradle to grave becomes apparent, though for
different reasons. On the other hand, the dynamism and flexibility
called for by Ladeur and others may seem difficult to reconcile with the
stability and predictability that we have come to associate with law. A
closer look at the kinds of criteria generally associated with the rule of
law, however, indicates that keeping actors' obligations constantly in
motion as understandings evolve could be managed in a manner
compatible with rule of law objectives such as clarity, knowability, and
the prospective nature of legal rules. To return to the example of the
management plan, while it is true that actors seeking to obtain or retain
certification do not know precisely what kinds of practices and measures
they will need to engage in to maintain certification, they do know that
they will have to maintain programs of research and assessment and to
foster links with a range of different communities-local and epistemic.
Their obligations can be seen as stable, if one ceases to consider the
substantive obligations as the main focus of attention, as these ought to
be a moving target if the regime is to function as it should.
One function of law that cannot readily be accomplished by the
Councils or within their networks as currently constituted is
apportionment of liability. Given that certification, the Councils'
standards, and the management plans developed by industry actors
possess an experimental quality, attention must turn at some point to
the processes that ought to be set in motion when these experiments go
terribly wrong. The threat of withdrawal of certification is unlikely to
provide an adequate incentive in the face of significant financial gains
from resource exploitation and the likelihood that industry actors can
point to uncertainty and scientific controversy if their management
plans turn out to be inadequate. A much stronger incentive to carry out
rigorous and extensive assessments and to make necessary allowances
for potential shortcomings in management plans would be provided by
the threat of liability.76 This would require the establishment of much
stronger connections between Council law and state-based law.
76. Gunther Teubner, The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in
Ecological Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
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CONCLUSION
As the Councils and their certification programs are currently
configured, law appears to be conceived of mainly as a conduit among
the various systems implicated in the networks. The rules structure the
contribution of politics to the network by defining the roles of various
groups of stakeholders and creating fora and channels for participation
and feedback. However, the rules are far from having a life of their own.
At present, the emphasis is on legitimacy and credibility rather than
validity, and serious questions remain regarding the extent to which the
rule of law is respected. Indeed, the nature of environmental decision-
making renders necessary an extensive reflection about the role that
law can usefully play.
In the networks constituted by the FSC and MSC, the process of
constitutionalism has proceeded far enough to make available the
resources of politics, economics, and science to the certification
networks, but not far enough to establish boundaries among those
systems. Within the network, law risks being swamped by these other
systems.77 Further, the potential contributions that law could make, as
an autonomous social system and not merely as a system of conduits
connecting other systems to the network, are not readily apparent.
The Councils' certification programs are interesting and important
experiments in environmental governance, not only because they rely on
state-based authority only incidentally, but also because of the manner
in which rulemaking and decision-making is constituted. No clear
division of labor among the social systems and bodies of expertise
brought together within the Council's network can be hoped, or even
wished, for, but in time each of these social systems may come to
develop more sophisticated models of the others. Just as biology is
seeking to develop more sophisticated methodologies that are better
suited to account for the complexity of ecosystems, law could, for
example, develop more sophisticated operations for scientific inputs.
This will be necessary in order for law (and politics) to be in a position to
address scientific uncertainty, coding it not as ignorance or absence of
proof of risk, but rather as provisional or partial knowledge.
At the same time, the constitution of these networks must enable
them to look outward at cognate regimes and bodies of law. The
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION, 17 (Gunther Teubner, et al.
eds., 1994).
77. Similarly, as Jean-Christophe Graz notes, the autonomy of politics is endangered
by the process of convergence, or structural coupling, that these networks bring about.
International Standards and the Service Economy, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND
THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS, supra note 14, at 209, 218.
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incorporation by reference of domestic and international resource
exploitation law, and, in the case of the FSC, labor, human rights, and
other bodies of social justice law, has to date resulted in only superficial
connections among these bodies of law. As the Councils gain influence
and their certification programs come to have a wider impact, conflicts
between Council law and other sets of normative expectations will
increase in frequency and intensity.

